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The Better Part of Wisdom is Deference: Judicial Review of an
Office of Conservation Order in Yuma Petroleum Co. v.
Thompson
I. INTRODUCTION
In Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson,' the Louisiana Supreme Court was called
upon to review an order of the Commissioner of Conservation (the
"Commissioner").2 The court deferred to the Commissioner, and wisely affirmed
a long-standing policy of the Department of Conservation, namely the "operator of
record" doctrine' which allows the Commissioner to carry out his statutory duties
to protect the environment. This paper will first discuss the Yuma case itself. A
discussion of the court's reasoning will be followed by a look at the operator of
record doctrine, which was the basis for the Commissioner's decision. Next, the
court's decision will be discussed in the context of judicial deference to
administrative decisions in general, focusing on the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning inthe landmark administrative lawcases National LaborRelations Board
v. Hearst Publications4 and Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council.' Finally, other administrative law doctrines based on judicial deference
to agency decisions will be discussed, including primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and the prohibition against collateral attacks.
II. FACTS AND HOLDiNG OF YUMA PETROLEUM CO. V. THOMPSON,
On November 1, 1990, Yuma Petroleum Company ("Yuma") acquired an oil,
gas, and mineral lease from Oil Lift, Inc. ("Oil Lift"). One week later, the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") inspected the site and
found unauthorized discharges of oilfield waste caused by an improperly closed
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. 731 So. 2d 190 (La. 1999).
2. The Commissioner heads the Department ofConservation,a deparmnntwithin the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources, which is charged with the task of regulating all natural resources not
specifically under the jurisdiction of another state agency. La. R.S. 36:359(D) (1989 and Supp. 2000)
and La. R.S. 30:1(C) (1989). Virtually all authority to regulate the oil and gas industry is held by the
office of the Commissioner of Conservation. La. R.S. 30:1 - 101.10 (1989 and Supp. 2000); Hunt Oil
Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191, 197 (La. 1994).
3. The "operator of record" doctrine was not defined by Louisiana courts until Yuma. Under
the doctrine, the Commissioner is not required to pursue all previous operators of a well and apportion
responsibility among them for remediation of the area. Rather, the Commissioner can simply hold the
current record operator of a lease liable for the cleanup. Yuma Petroleum Co., 731 So. 2d at 195.
4. 322U.S. 111,64 S. Ct. 851 (1944).
5. 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
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well pit. DEQ subsequently issued a compliance order requiring Yuma to cease all
discharges, clean up all contaminated materials, prepare and implement a spill
prevention and control plan, and close all pits. While conducting the remedial
operations as directed by DEQ, Yuma requested a public hearing before the
Commissioner6 to determine what portion of the cost of the restoration and
remediation effort could be recovered by Yuma from the past operators of the well,
including Oil Lift. The Commissioner issued a compliance order directing Yuna
to submit a plan to remediate the area, and subsequently advised Yuma that he was
without authority to apportion the costs among the previous lease holders, but,
nonetheless, would grant Yuma a hearing. At the hearing, the Commissioner
affirmed his previous compliance order, noting that the order was not intended to
affect any contractual claims Yuma may have against any previous lease holders.
Yuma sought judicial review of the Commissioner's order.
The district court affirmed the Commissioner's order. However, the first
circuit reversed, stating that the Commissioner erred as a matter of law by not
designating former lease holders, including Oil Lift, as "owners" as defined in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:3(8)' and by not holding them responsible for the
clean-up with Yuma.' The supreme court reversed the first circuit decision and
reinstated the Commissioner's compliance order, stating that the legislature had
intended to grant to the Commissioner the discretion to order either the current or
past operators to clean up the well. The court further ruled that holding Yuma
primarily liable for the clean-up effort was not an abuse of discretion because the
operator of record doctrine allows the Commissioner to hold the current operator
of record liable.9
HI. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Judicial Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's rules, regulations and orders is governed
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12.'0 To fully understand the role that courts play
6. The legislature by Acts 1990, No. 192, § I amended La. R.S. 30:4(C)(16)(a) (Supp. 2000)
and gave the Commissioner the authority to "require the pltugging of each abandoned well or each well
which is of no further use .... Only an owner as defined in R.S. 30:3(8) shall be held or deemed
responsible for the performance of any actions required by the commissioner." Thus, although DEQ
issued the initial compliance order, the matter subsequently came within the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner.
7. La. ItS. 30:3(8) (Supp. 2000) provides: ."Owner' means the person, including operators and
producers acting on behalf of the person, who has or had the right to drill into and to produce from a
pool and to appropriate the production for himself or for others."
8. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 709 So. 2d 824, 828 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
9. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 193-95 (La. 1999).
10. The scope ofreview ofthe Commissioner in La. R.S. 30:12 (1989) is similar to that provided
for in the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Compare La. R.S. 30:12 (1989) with La. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 2000) and 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1996). La. R.S.
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in reviewing agency actions under this statute, agency actions must be separated
into findings of fact, interpretations of law, and mixed questions of fact and law."
It is well settled that the manifestly erroneous test is used to review the
Commissioner's findings of fact.' A court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the Commissioner absent a showing that his finding was manifestly erroneous.
Reasons for such a narrow scope of review of findings of fact include a legislative
and judicial acknowledgment of the Commissioner's expertise in oil and gas
conservation matters, and that as the trier of fact, the Commissioner is in a better
position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.
In contrast to findings of fact, the Commissioner's interpretations of law are
typically afforded little or no deference on judicial review." The primary
justification for this broad scope of review is the general belief that when it comes
to interpreting the law the courts are the experts, not the Commissioner. However,
many agency actions do not fit easily within either the fact or law category, often
involiving what are known as mixed questions of fact and law.'4 In fact, application
of law to a set of facts is itself a mixed question of fact and law and yet it is still
committed to agency discretion.'5 Consequently, these acts are reviewed by the
courts soley for abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action. 6
30:12 (1989) provides in pertinent part that:
The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Arbitrary or capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion; or
(f) Manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and, substantial evidence on the
whole record. In the application of the rule, where the [Commissioner] has the opportunity
to judge the credibility of witnesses by first-hand observation of demeanor on the witness
stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the [Commissioner's]
determination on credibility issues.
11. This is a common and accepted method of classifying agency actions to determine
appropriate standards of judicial review. See Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law 527-30 (3d ed.
1991); Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 463 (1993); Ronald M. Levin,
Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 Geo. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1985).
12. La. R.S. 30:12(BX5Xf) (1989). Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191,200 (La. 1994);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 566 So. 2d 138, 145 (La. App. I st Cir.), writ denied, 511 So. 2d 627,
628 (1990); Summers v. Sutton, 428 So. 2d 1121,1129 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Gill, 194 So. 2d 351, 354 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1966).
13. La. R.S. 30:12(BX5Xa)-(d) (1989) provide the court with authority to review agency actions
for errors of law. See Tex/Con Oil and Gas Co. v. Batchelor, 634 So. 2d 902, 907 (La. App. Ist Cir
1994).
14. See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 689; Aman & Mayton, supra note 11, at 463; Levin, supra
note 11, at 10-11.
15. Levin, supra note 11, at 12.
16. La. R.S. 30:12(BX5Xe) (1989); Tex/Con 011, 634 So. 2d at 907; Amoco Prod., 566 So. 2d
at 146; See also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152,1159 (La.
1984).
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In Yuma, the court employed a two-step test to review the Commissioner's
decision. First, the court considered whether the Commissioner's interpretation of
law was correct. The legislative intent behind the definition of "owner"'17 was
reviewed de novo, with no deference paid to the Commissioner's interpretation.
The court concluded that the interpretation offered by the Commissioner was
correct because the legislature granted him the discretion to pursue either the
current "owner" or previous ones." Second, the court had to decide whether the
Commissioner had abused his discretion by holding Yuma liable for the clean-up
effort." The court concluded that under the "operator of record" doctrine, the
decision was not an abuse of discretion for the Commissioner.2"
B. Step One of the Analysis: Statutory Interpretation of "Owner"
The first step in the analysis concerned the scope of the Commissioner's
authority granted to him by the legislature. To resolve this question, the court in
Yuma conducted a statutory analysis of the provisions authorizing the
Commissioner to require an operator to remediate the area specifically under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:4(C)(16)(a).2' However, only an "owner"
defined in Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:3(8) must answer to the
Commissioner.'
The definition of"owner" in Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:3(8) was amended
in 1993. Prior to the 1993 amendment, "owner" was defined as, "the person who
has the right to drill into and to produce from a pool and to appropriate the
production either for himself or for others." Following the 1993 amendment,
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:3(8) defined "owner" as "the person, including
operator and producers acting on behalf of the person, who has or had the right to
17. La. R.S. 30:3(8) (Supp. 2000).
18. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 193-94 (La. 1999).
19. As will be discussed later, even though the Commissioner held Yuma liable, this did not
preclude Yuma from seeking indenmification from former operators or any other third party, based on
any contractual provisions between them.
20. Yuma Petroleum Co., 731 So. 2d at 195.
21. La. R.S. 30:4(16Xa) (Supp. 2000) authorizes the Conmmissioner:
[t]o regulate by rules, the drilling, casing, cementing, disposal interval, monitoring, plugging
and permitting of disposal wells which are used to inject waste products in the subsurface
and to regulate all surface and storage waste facilities incidental to oil and gas exploration
and production, in such a manner as to prevent the escape of such waste product into a fresh
groundwater aquifer or into oil and gas strata; may require the plugging of each abandoned
well or each well which is of no further use and the closure of associated pits, the removal
of equipment, structures, and trash, and other general site cleanup of such abandoned or
unused well sites; and may require reasonable bond with security for the performance of the
duty to plug each abandoned well or each well which is of no further use and to perform the
site cleanup required by this Subparagraph. Only an owner as defined in R.S. 30:3(8) shall
be held or deemed responsible for the performance of any actions required by the
Commissioner.
(emphasis added).
22. Id.
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drill into and produce from a pool and to appropriate the production either for
himself or for other." 
3
Yurma argued that the addition of the words "or had" required that the
Commissioner proceed against both the present and former lease holders. Further,
Yuma argued that the Commissioner must hold a hearing to decide whether Oil
Lift, the previous operator, had caused the damage, and thereafter apportion
responsibility for the cleanup accordingly.2" The Commissioner maintained that
the amendment did not mandate that he proceed against former lease holders, but
rather that it gave him the discretion to proceed against either the current or any past
operators, whichever he decided was more appropriate in the performance of his
statutory duties. 2' Finally, the Commissioner invoked the operator of record
doctrine asjustification for holding only Yuma responsible for the clean-up because
it was the current -operator of record. Therefore, it was of no consequence that
another company might have caused any of the damage.'
The legislative intent behind the 1993 amendment to "owner ' 7 was reviewed
de novo in accordance with Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12. In concluding that
the amendment gave the Commissioner discretion to decide who he would hold
responsible for the well clean up, the court noted that the amendment was a
"Commissioner's bill." As such, it was designed to afford the Commissioner more
discretion, not an amendment designed to encumber the Commissioner."
Even without referring to the legislative history, the court could have come to
the same conclusion about the amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:3(8)
for at least two other reasons. First, the court could have conducted a purely textual
interpretation of the amendment. The pertinent part of the 1993 amendment is
phrased as "has or had the right ... ."30 If the legislature had intended to require
that the Commissioner pursue all previous owners in addition to the current owner,
it could have phrased the amendment as "has and had the right ... ." Use of a
disjunctive instead ofa conjunctive term is strong evidence that the legislative intent
was for the Commissioner to have the discretion to choose among both present and
past operators in requiring well site remediation.
A second tack the court could have taken to reach the same result would have
been to determine whether the logical consequences ofYuma's argument would be
23. (Emphasis added). The Commissioner issued his compliance order before La. R.S. 30:3(8)
(Supp. 2000) was amended. Neither party raised the issue of whether the pre-amendment definition
should apply to these facts, nor did the Supreme Court discuss the issue.
24. Yuma Petroleum Co., 731 So. 2d at 191.
25. Id. at 194.
26. Id. at 192.
27. La. RKS. 30:3(8) (Supp. 2000).
28. La. R.S. 30: 12(BX5Xa)-(d) (1989) provide the court with authority to review agency actions
for enors of law. See Tex/Con Oil and Gas Co. v. Batchelor, 634 So. 2d 902, 907 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1994).
29. Yuma Petroleum Co., 731 So. 2d at 193-94. See also Chevron v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d
1138 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that the Commi."ssioner may be able to hold a previous lessee liable as an
"owner" to clean and close a well even before the 1993 amendment).
30. La. R.S. 30:3(8) (Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
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consistent with the legislature's intent. This approach illustrates some
important aspects of administrative law and the powers of governmental agencies.
If Yuma's argument was correct, the Commissioner should have pursued not only
Yuma, but all previous lease holders as well. Depending on the well in question,
there might be dozens of past operators, some of which may not even be in business
anymore at the time of the hearing. Yuma would have the Commissioner hold a
hearing at which the parties would argue about who caused the damage resulting
from the improper closing of the pit. Then the Commissioner would have to
apportion the liability for the cleanup among the parties. However, contracts
between successive lease holders often contain indemnity and assumption of
liability clauses." To apportion liability properly, as Yuma suggested, the
Commissioner would have had to interpret these private contractual rights among
the parties.
The Office of Conservation, just like other administrative agencies, is a body
with limited jurisdiction and authority that derives its power from the legislature.32
Nowhere in the statutes governing the office has the legislature granted the
Commissioner the authority to adjudicate contractual rights between private parties.
In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "this is ... a contract
dispute pure and simple which the Commissioner cannot resolve.... ."" Contract
disputes "can only be resolved on the application of legal precepts and principles
governing the interpretation of contracts, after a trial on the merits .... ."' In Yuma,
the Commissioner was aware of the limits of his power and made it a point to say
that he did not intend "to affect any contractual rights [that] Yuma may have against
third parties." '5 The court in Yuma also recognized the limits of the
Commissioner's authority and stated that apportioning the costs among previous
operators "was a matter of contract law which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner."36 Yuma's claim against third parties could be satisfied in a judicial
forum, and the availability of this remedy was not precluded by the Commissioner's
decision.
Because of the lack of legislative authority for the Commissioner to adjudicate
private contractual rights, Yuma's argument that the Commissioner must hold a
hearing between present and past lease holders to apportion responsibility rightly
failed. In order to succeed, Yuma would have had to convince the court that the
legislature, by enacting the 1993 amendment to Louisiana Revised Statutes 3 0:3(8),
intended to grant the Commissioner the power to .determine contractual rights
between private parties. This argument is tenuous at best. Presumably, if the
legislature wished to make such a significant change in the power of the
Commissioner, it would have been more explicit.
31. See, e.g., Chevron v. Traillour Oil Co., 987 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1993).
32. La. R.S. 30:1-28 (1989 and Supp. 2000).
33. Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 257 La. 207, 211, 241 So. 2d 911, 912
(1970).
34. Id. at 211, 241 So. 2d at 912.
35. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 192 (La. 1999).
36. Id. at 197.
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Another consequence of Yuma's argument that the Commissioner is
empowered to determine private contractual rights would be a significant loss of
administrative efficiency, Each year, the Commissioner issues about 350
compliance orders." If, after each issuance, the Commissioner were required to
conduct a hearing with all past operators to determine their percentage interests in
each lease and to apportion fault for environmental damage, the Office of
Conservation would not have the resources to carry out this burdensome task. Such
a situation would lead to tremendous delays and could prevent the Commissioner
from effectively carrying out his duty to protect the environment.
The Commissioner has not only a statutory duty to protect the environment but
also a constitutional one." The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that "[t]he
natural resources of the state ... shall be protected, conserved, and replenished
insofar as possible ... [and] the legislature shall enact laws to implement this
policy."39 The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that this provision, referred to
as the "public trust" doctrine, imposes on all state agencies a duty to protect the
environment, and mandates that the legislature "enact laws to implement fully this
policy." If the legislature had intended the Commissioner to do as Yuma argued
but did not provide the Office of Conservation with the resources to carry out such
a burdensome task, such a provision would arguably be unconstitutional because it
would be inconsistent with the public trust doctrine.
Therefore, based on the above considerations, the court in Yuma came to the
correct conclusion: the legislature did not intend to mandate that the Commissioner
proceed against both current and past operators. Rather, the legislature intended to
grant the Commissioner the discretion to decide who to pursue to enforce his
compliance orders.
C. Step Two of the Analysis: Did the Commissioner abuse his discretion?
After the court concluded that the statute gave the Commissioner
discretion to proceed either against the current owner or any previous
owners, it next sought to determine the appropriate scope of review applicable to
the Commissioner's decision. Because the Commissioner's action was an
application of law to fact, or a mixed question of law and fact, it would be reviewed
under the "abuse of discretion standard."' Since the Commissioner had invoked
the operator of record doctrine in holding Yuma liable, the court held that the
Commissioner did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and did not abuse his
discretion.42
37. Brief for Commissioner at 9.
38. Save Ourselves, inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
39. La. Const. art. IX, § 1.
40. Save Ourselves Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1156.
41. La. R.S. 30:12(BX5Xe) (1989); Tex/Con Oil and Gas Co. v. Batchelor, 634 So. 2d 902,909
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 566 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990); see
also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
42. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 197 (La. 1999).
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Although the operator of record doctrine was a long-standing policy of the
Office of Conservation, before Yuma, no Louisiana state court had discussed its
application in Louisiana.43 Federal jurisprudence has recognized a similar doctrine
for almost twenty years." The Louisiana and the federal doctrines are similar in
that they both give the administrative agency discretion to hold a current operator
accountable to the agency, even if other parties were involved in the problem that
the agency seeks to resolve. Because of the absence of a discussion of the
Louisiana operator of record doctrine in cases and commentary, a brief description
of the federal operator liability doctrine is in order to illustrate other circumstances
in which the doctrine has been used.
1. The Operator Liability Doctrine in the Federal Jurisprudence
The operator liability doctrine was first discussed in Sauder v. Department of
Energy.45 Sauder was a part owner and the operator of three contiguous oil leases,
which were part of the same pool, but which were never unitized." The absence of
unitization is important because the regulations in place at the time limited the
amount that could be charged for oil, but exempted stripper wells.47 If the leases
were unitized, they would have constituted a single property, and the oil from that
property would have qualified as stripper well oil. The Department of Energy
argued successfully that because the leases had not been formally unitized, the
production must be computed separately for each lease.48 That being the case, not
all of the oil Sauder sold actually qualified as stripper well oil, and he overcharged
the buyer for much of it. Sauder argued that because he owned only about a one-
third interest in the leases-and therefore only received about one-third of the
overcharge-he should have been required to pay back only his share of the
overcharges."9 The court agreed with the Department of Energy and held that even
though Sauder received about one-third of the overcharge, he had to refund the full
amount because he was the current operator.-'
43. The doctrine was mentioned in one unpublished federal district court case. The Louisiana
Land & Exploration Co. v. Unocal Corp, No. 93-1540, 1997 WL 756597 (E.D. La. Dec. 5, 1997). In
this case, Unocal was the operator of a well, and settled with the Department of Energy because Unocal
allegedly overcharged customers for oil. Unocal sued for reimbursement from another interest owner,
the Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. The court stated that the federal operator liability doctrine gave
Unocal a cause of action for reimbursement against the other interest owners but that the interest owners
could then assert affirmative defenses such as breach of contract.
44. The doctrine is known in the federaljurisprudenceasthe operator liability doctrine. Although
the federal doctrine and the Louisiana operator of record doctrine are not identical, the names will be
used interchangeably in the present paper.
45. 648 F.2d 1341 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981).
46. A pool is an underground reservoir containing oil and gas. Unitization is the joint operation
of all or some portion of a producing reservoir. Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Manual of
Oil and Gas Terms 820, 1175 (9th ed. 1994).
47. A stripper well is a property that produces fewer than ten barrels per day.
48. Sauder, 648 F.2d at 1345-46.
49. Id. at 1347.
50. Id. at 134748.
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In addition to the fact that Sauder "caused the overcharges,"'" another reason
for the court's finding that Sauder was liable for the entire overcharge was that
requiring the Department of Energy to seek refunds from each percentage owner
would have placed an undue burden on the agency and hampered its ability to
enforce its price control regulations. 2 Indeed, this rationale supports the
Commissioner's decision in Yuma. If the Commissioner was required to apportion
responsibility among all past operators, he would likewise be unable to enforce his
statutory duties. Furthermore, even though Sauder was required to refund the total
amount of the overcharge, he was not left without a remedy."' The proper forum for
the cost of the rebate to be apportioned among the various interest owners is a court,
which is well suited to adjudicate any private contractual matters dealing with
contribution and indemnity that Sauder may have with other interest owners.
Nothing in Sauder prejudiced Mr. Sauder's ability to enforce his rights in court.
The operator liability doctrine was again discussed in United States v. Exxon
Corp.,' in which Exxon overcharged purchasers by incorrectly computing the
maximumprice under the existing price control regulations. 5 While in Sauder, Mr.
Sauder was ordered to pay only about $342,000 in overcharges, Exxon, as the
current operator of the well, was ordered to repay over $1.6 billion.' While it was
important that Exxon caused the overcharges, the court also stressed the importance
of administrative efficiency in enforcing regulations and recognized the limits of an
agency's ability to adjudicate all the potential claims between Exxon and the other
interest owners. The court stated that "[t]o require the Government to gather
evidence and to bring multiple actions against more than 200 working interest
owners, and 2,200 royalty interest owners in the Hawkins Field would 'plunge the
agency into an 'administrative quagmire' which would effectively block
enforcement of oil price controls. .. .,"" Exxon was not precluded from suing the
other interest owners for contribution or indenmification based on the contracts
between those parties.5 Therefore, although Exxon was ordered to rebate some
overcharge amounts which went to other interest owners, they were still afforded
a remedy in court.
As illustrated in Sauder v. Department of Energy and United States v. Exxon
Corp., the federal jurisprudence on operator liability states that the discretion
against whom to proceed belongs to the administrative agency charged with the task
of regulating the matter in question. If agencies were not allowed to simply hold
51. Id. at 1347.
52. Id. at 1348.
53. See Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 145 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1998) (where a former lessee was
assessed for the entire cost of cleaning up an oil and gas site, paid for the cleanup, and then successfully
sued to enforce a contract stipulating that the assignee was liable to the forner lessee for the cleanup
costs).
54. 773 F.2d 1240 (Temp. Emner. CL App. 1985).
55. Id. at 1247-53.
56. Id. at 1246; Sauder v. Department of Energy, 648 F.2d 1341 (Temp. Emer. Ct. Ap. 1981).
57. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d at 1270 (quoting United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 850
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
58. Exxon Corp., 773 F.2d at 1271-72.
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an operator liable and instead had to pursue all parties involved, they would face an
unmanageable burden and would not be able to carry out their statutory duties.
Importantly, even though an operator is held liable, the operator it is not prejudiced
because the agency's actions do not affect any contractual rights that may exist
between the operator and third parties.
2. The Operator Doctrine in Louisiana
Although the operator of record doctrine had not been discussed by Louisiana
courts before Yuma, it was not a new policy of the Office of Conservation. The
policy of holding the operator liable manifests itself in the regulations promulgated
by the Commissioner as well as in recognized industry practice.
The Commissioner is authorized to promulgate, after notice and hearing,
regulations and orders which are necessary to carry out his statutory duties.59 The
notion that the current operator is responsible for carrying out the Commissioner's
orders permeates these regulations. The regulationmost relevant to the present case
is Statewide Order 29-B, which governs the construction, maintenance and closure
of production and other pits. Regarding pit closure, it provides in pertinent part:
"Operators may close pits utilizing onsite land treatment, burial, solidification or
other techniques approved by the Office of Conservation .... Liability for pit
closures shall not be transferred from an operator to the owner of the surface
land(s) on which a pit is located." W This language clearly imposes liability on the
operator for properly cleaning and closing the well pit.
In addition to being manifest in the fegulations on closing and cleaning well
pits, operator liability is also found in the regulations governing various aspects of
oil and gas production. For example, operators of multiple completion wells are
required to submit well tests to the Commissioner and are required to repair any
intercommunication between the pools.6 Operators of wells with commingled
production are required to maintain and record daily checks ofwellhead pressure.'
After certain conditions are met, operators of wells within the same non-unitized
pool are required to petition the Commissioner for a hearing to determine the
correct spacing of the wells in the field.' Finally, operators are required to submit
applications for tubingless completions" and substitute wells.65 These regulations
all look to the operator of record as the party responsible to the Commissioner."
59. La. R.S. 30:4 (Supp. 2000).
60. La. Admin. Code 43:XIX.129.B.6a-b. (emphasis added).
61. Statewide Order 29-C-4, La. Admin. Code 43:XIX.1305.
62. Statewide Order 29-D-1, La. Adniin. Code 43:XIX.1505.2.c.vi.
63. Statewide Order 29-E, La. Admin. Code 43:XIX.1905-1909.
64. Statewide Order 29-J, La. Admin. Code 43:XIX.2705.
65. Statewide Order 29-K, La. Admin. Code 43:XIX.2905.
66. The idea that an agency can look to a particular designated individual for liability is found
not only in Louisiana, but also in federal regulations. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) of the
Department of the Interior is a federal agency charged with the task of regulating all mineral production
from the outer continental shelf. MMS's regulations focus on the "record title owner" as the responsible
party. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 3100.0-5 (1999) and 30 C.F.R. §§ 210.55, 218.52, 250.108, 256.52
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The policy of operator liability is found not only in the regulations promulgated
by the Commissioner but is also explicitly described in a policy memorandum
written by the Commissioner in 1990 entitled Enforcement Policy-Abandoned
Wells & Pits. The memorandum acknowledges that the Policy of the Office of
Conservation is to hold responsible the current operator to properly close pits,
which may entail ordering remediation efforts like the order directed at Yuma.6 It
also states that if the current operator no longer exists, the Commissioner will
"pursue a line of succession" beginning with the current operator and working
backwards in time. The suggestion of agency discretion is implicit in this policy.
Indeed, this discretion is a necessity for the Office of Conservation because it
provides the Commissioner with the ability to hold someone liable; this allows him
to successfully carry out his statutory duties. It also serves as a sound
environmental policy because the Commissioner will always have a responsible
party to pursue to make sure wells are properly cleaned and closed. Under the facts
of Yuma, the Commissioner can simply hold Yuma liable for the clean-up effort,
and then Yuma may pursue previous operators for contribution. On the other hand,
if Yuma was unavailable because they were no longer in business, the
Commissioner could exercise his discretion and look to Yuma's predecessor(s) to
close the well." Without discretion to pursue either Pe current operator or past
operators, the Commissioner would be less able to conserve oil and gas resources
and to protect the environment.
Because the policy of holding the operator of record liable to the
Commissioner permeates the Commissioner's regulations and is explicitly
stated in a promulgated policy memorandum, it is common knowledge in the
oil and gas community that the Commissioner's orders are to be directed at
the operator of record." With this knowledge, parties can factor their
potential liability into negotiations before becoming operators of wells. Of
course, parties are free to negotiate various contractual indemnity agreements
and apportion liability between themselves. However, these agreements,
whether between successive operators or between operators and working
interest owners, affect neither the Commissioner nor his authority to impose
liability. Conversely, the Commissioner's imposition of operator liability does
not affect those contractual arrangements between the parties.7" The proper
(1999).
67. The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that operator of record doctrine was a "pre-existing"
policy at the time the memorandum was written, which is several months before Yuma acquired the
lease from Oil Lift. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 195 (La. 1999).
68. If a previous operator who has agreed to indemnify the current operator is no longer in
business, the current operator can still be held liable to the Commissioner. This is simply a risk that
an oil company takes when it chooses to become the operator on a particular piece of property. Before
such an action is taken, the company has the opportunity to inspect the piece of property and determine
whether it wishes to assume that risk.
69. Yuma Petroleum Co., 731 So. 2d at 194-95, 197. See also Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick H.
Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization §13 (3d ed. 1989).
70. In Office of Conservation Order 170-6, the Commissioner stated, "This order is not intended
to affect any contractual or other rights which Yuma Operating Company may have against any third
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forum for settling disputes between successive operators over cleanup costs
is the court.
Davis Oil Co. v. YS, Inc. is a good example of a case where the court
adjudicated just this kind of dispute.7 In Davis, Davis Oil Company
("Davis") sold its interest in an oil and gas lease. The purchase agreement
contained a provision whereby the buyer "consents to be responsible for
Davis Oil's obligations under the lease."' Davis and the subsequent operators of
the well were summoned to a hearing to determine who should pay for the cleanup.
Only Davis appeared, and it was assessed for the entire cost of cleaning up the well
site.73 After paying for the cleanup, Davis sued its buyer's successor in interest
based on the contractual provisions providing for indemnification. The court
decided that Davis should be indemnified.7' Davis demonstrates not only that an
agency order does not prejudice the rights of a party imposed with initial liability,
but also that contracts between successive lessees often involve highly complex
legal problems that are much more suited for a court to handle. For instance, in
Davis, the court faced the following issues: (1) a choice of law issue involving a
determination of which law should govern a contract clause, (2) an issue under
Louisiana law of obligations where the court had to determine whether a third-party
was an intended or incidental beneficiary, and (3) the interpretation of contractual
language.
75
IV. COMPARISON OF YUMA wrrH FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The Louisiana Supreme Court's reasoning in Yuma is reminiscent of several
landmark administrative law cases decided by the United States Supreme Court:
National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 6 and Chevron v.
Natural Resources Defense Council." These cases are similar to Yuma in that the
important question facing the court was the appropriate scope of judicial review of
an administrative action giving content to a statutory term. Although neither Hearst
nor Chevron was mentioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Yuma, in those two
cases the United States Supreme Court employed the same two-step test as did the
Yuma Court.
In Hearst, several newspaper publishers refused to collectively bargain with a
union representing newspaper carriers. The National Labor Relations Board (the
"Board"), after conducting a hearing, found that the newspaper carriers met the
definition of"employee" under the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act"), which
party and is not intended to affect any contractual rights any third party may have against Yuma
OperatingConpany."
71. 145 F.3d 305 (5thCir. 1998).
72. Id. at 307.
73. Id. The subsequent operator who failed to clean up the site did not show up at the hearing.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id. at 309-17.
76. 322 U.S. 87,1 14 S. Ct. 851 (194).
77. 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
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allowed the carriers to unionize and demand collective bargaining with the
publishers. The publishers disagreed, arguing that the newspaper carriers did not
fit within the definition of "employees," and that the carriers were not allowed to
unionize and require collective bargaining.
In deciding Hearst, the United States Supreme Court employed a two-step
analysis. The first step involved a de novo review of the congressional intent
behind the Act. Noting that Congress did not explicitly define "employee,""8 the
Court concluded that defining "employee" was "assigned primarily to the agency
created by Congress to administer the Act."79 The Court, in the second step of the
analysis, deferred to the Board's decision in the adjudicatory proceeding, which
gave content to the term "employee." The court stated that "where the question is
one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the
agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's
function is limited.""
As in Hearst, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Yuma found that the legislature
did not specifically define "owner," but rather gave the Commissioner the
"discretion to proceed.., against prior owners in certain circumstances."", The
court deferred to the Commissioner's interpretation of "owner" in accordance with
the Office of Conservation policy, the operator of record doctrine and affirmed
Yuma's liability for the cleanup.'
Both the United States Supreme Court in Hearst, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Yuma, recognized the importance of deference to an administrative
agency's decision about how to apply a statutory term to a set of facts based on the
agency's expertise in the matter in question. It is important to note that the initial
step of the analysis in both Hearst and Yuma does not require deference to the
agency's interpretation of the extent of its authority delegated to it by the
legislature. Both the United States and the Louisiana Supreme Courts properly
conducted a de novo review of the statute to determine whether Congress or the
legislature intended a specific meaning for the terms in question. Only after
deciding that both statutes left it to the agency to give a meaning to the terms in the
context of specific circumstances did the courts defer to the agencies' application
of the law to a particular set of facts. Although there is still some debate in the area,
many commentators consider the application of law to a set of facts by an
administrative agency a mixed question of law and fact where a court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.' In both Hearst and Yuma, the
78. After Hearst, Congress defined "employee" in 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1998). Although this
definition is inconsistent with the Board's, the Court's analysis of the Board's discretion to define
"employee" was not affected by this legislation.
79. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 1J.S. at 130, 64 S.Ct. 851, 860.
80. Id. at 131, 64 S. Ct. at 860.
81. Yuma Petroleum Co. v. Thompson, 731 So. 2d 190, 193-94(La. 1999).
82. Id. at 194-97.
83. Levin, supranote l,at 12. SeeSchwartzsupranote 11, at 689-701 andAman&Mayton,
supra note 11, at 463-66 for a discussion of various approaches to reviewing mixed questions of law
and fact.
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agency orders were held not to be abuses of the discretion afforded to the agency
by the statutes.
Administrative agencies give content to ambiguous statutory terms not only
through adjudicatory proceedings as in Hearst and Yuma, but also through their
rule-making authority to promulgate regulations defining statutory terms." In
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), pursuant to its authority to regulate pollution emitting sites,
promulgated a regulation that permitted the States to define a "stationary source"
as an entire industrial plant as opposed to one particular pollution-emitting device
in an industrial plant.8 5 This regulation was challenged as an impermissible
interpretation of the term "stationary source."'" The United States Supreme Court
again employed the two-step approach in reviewing the agency action. First, in
order to determine whether the EPA had the authority to promulgate a regulation
defining "stationary source," the Court asked "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' Concluding that Congress did not have
a particular meaning in mind and that the statute was ambiguous as to the meaning
of "stationary source," the Court stated that the proper role of the judiciary was to
decide whether the agency's interpretation was "based on a permissible construction
of the statute. ' .. The Court affirmed the EPA's regulation because their definition
of the term was not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."' '
Even though Chevron involved an agency's administration of a statute in the
form of a regulation instead of via an adjudication, the Court took a similar
approach to reviewing the agency decision as did the Hearst and Yuma courts. The
gist of all of these decisions is that once a court answers questions of law, its proper
role is to defer to agency discretion in carrying out its statutory duties, regardless
of whether the agency exercises its discretion by adjudication or rule-naking. If
the legislature intended to grant the agency discretion to give content to an
ambiguous statutory term, then the proper role of the judiciary is to defer to the
exercise of agency discretion and reverse agency decisions only if they are
characterized as an abuse of that discretion.
V. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINES
Judicial deference to administrative agency decisions is not found only in the
limited scope of judicial review of agency discretion, but it is also a theme that is
84. La. R.S. 30:4 (Supp. 2000) grants this authority to the Office of Conservation. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553-54 (1996) for the law governing adjudication and rule making authority of federal agencies.
85. 467 U.S. 837, 840, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2780 (1984). Only four years after it was decided,
Justice Scalia called Chevron "a highly important decision--perhaps the most important in the field of
administrative law since Vermont Yankee... "Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke LJ. 511 (1989).
86. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 n.7, 104 S. Ct. at 2781 n.7.
87. Id. at 842, 104 S. Ct. at 2781.
88. Id. at 851, 104 S. Ct. at 2786.
89. Id. at 844, 104 S. Ct. at 2782.
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manifested in several administrative law doctrines. The doctrines of primary
jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the prohibition of collateral
attacks on an agency rulings and orders all recognize that for reasons such as
administrative expertise and efficiency, it is wise to allow agencies as much latitude
as possible in carrying out their prescribed tasks.
A. Primary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was created by courts to solve the problem
of overlapping jurisdiction of courts with that of an administrative agency.' The
doctrine permits courts to defer to an agency to make an initial determination on a
matter. The court will not consider the issue unless the agency's decision is
appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips
Oil Co., stated that, "[t]he deference to administrative agencies for an initial
decision on matters within the expertise of the agency, which is contemplated by the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court."' However, the doctrine was not applied in Magnolia to defer to the agency
because the petitioner was seeking monetary damages as a result of an improperly
closed well on his property and a court is the proper forum for awarding monetary
damages.' Several years later, the Fifth Circuit, in Mills v. Davis Oil Co.,93
explicitly recognized the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as part of the substantive
law of Louisiana which federal courts are bound to follow. In Mills, the court held
that it was not an abuse of discretion to defer to the Commissioner's jurisdiction to
determine a dispute about the proper amount of costs to be charged against Mills'
production revenues.
There are two significant reasons why courts should have the discretion to defer
to an agency on matters that are within that agency's competency." First, it is
important that there be uniformity in the application of laws and regulations in an
industry regulated by a governmental agency. This goal is more easily
accomplished if the agency is allowed to make initial determinations within its
jurisdiction. A second consideration is the recognition of agency expertise in
certain areas. Agencies work more closely and regularly with the laws and
regulations with which they are charged to administer than do the courts.
Moreover, agency regulations are often highly complex and technical. A
governmental agency more familiar with the regulations and the policies behind
them will presumably make more proper and consistent decisions in applying those
regulations than would a court.
90. See Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S. Ct. 350 (1907)
(the first case to recognize the doctrine of primary jurisdiction).
91. 576So. 2d475,489(La. 1991).
92. Id. at 483.
93. 1 F.3d 1298 (5th Cir. 1994).
94. See South-West Utils., Inc. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 339 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976) and Central La. Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comn'n, 601 So. 2d 1383 (La. 1992)
(Lemmon, J., concurring).
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B. Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies
In Louisiana, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
statutory requirement.9" Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12(A)(1) provides that a
person who is aggrieved by a law pertaining to oil and gas conservation or by an
action of the Commissioner may obtain judicial review only after he has "exhausted
his administrative remedy." The purpose of this doctrine is to avoid premature
interruption of the administrative process and to permit the administrative agency
to apply its expertise and the discretion delegated to it by the legislature in solving
a problem within its jurisdiction." The doctrine of exhaustion is different from
primary jurisdiction where the agency and the court both have jurisdiction over a
particular matter and the court merely defers to the agency's initial determination.
When a court refuses to hear a case because a petitioner has not exhausted his
administrative remedies, the court does not have jurisdiction over the matter until
the petitioner pursues all administrative avenues in seeking a remedy.
C. Prohibition Against Collateral Attacks
If an aggrieved party wishes to challenge an order of the Commissioner, he
must follow the procedures provided by the legislature in" Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:12." Any direct or indirect challenge to an order of the Commissioner
in a court not specified in the statute, or at a time later than provided in the statute
is a collateral attack and is not permitted."
The prohibition is not limited to those ,cases where the judgment of a court
would affect enforcement of or compliance with an order, but also includes cases
where the Commissioner is not a party and his order is an "operative fact upon
which the determination of the parties' respective rights directly depends." An
illustrative case is Simmons v. Pure Oil Co." where the Commissioner issued a
unitization order which included only a portion of Simmons' land in the production.
He issued the order after finding as a fact that the well operated by Pure Oil was
producing from a pool separate and distinct from another pool located elsewhere
on Simmons' land."'I Simmons alleged that Pure Oil breached its duty to Simmons,
as Simmons' lessee, in procuring the order, and requested dissolution of the lease.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on the pleadings, stating that
Simmons' allegations were contrary to the Commissioner's unitization order, and
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994) for the federal counterpart.
96. See Kramer & Martin, supra note 69, at §25.04, and Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise §15.2 (3d ed. 1994).
97. La. R.S. 30:12 (1989) provides, inter alia, that the venue for such suits is the district court
where the Commissioner's office is located, that the action must be brought within sixty days of the
administrative action that is the subject of the suit, and that the petitioner need not apply for a rehearing
before seeking judicial review.
98. Kramer & Martin, supra note 69, at §25.03.
99. Trahan v. Superior Oil Co., 700 F.2d 1004, 1015 (5th Cir. 1983).
100. 129 So. 2d 786 (La. 1961).
101. Id. at 789.
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that Simmons' suit was "nothing more than a collateral attack on the findings of the
Commissioner, which cannot be countenanced."'
0 2
The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to entertain Simmons' suit because that
would have required litigation over whether the Commissioner's finding of fact that
there were separate and distinct pools was correct. The Louisiana legislature, by
enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:12 has prohibited such a collateral attack
on an order of the Commissioner. If Simmons wanted to challenge the unitization
order, he had to follow the procedures for judicial review provided by the
legislature.10 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial deference is an important concept in administrative law. The
judiciary's role in reviewing agency actions involves determining whether the
agency is acting within the bounds that the legislature provided. Courts perform
this role with no deference to an agency's understanding of the extent of its power
because determining the bounds of agency power involves statutory interpretation,
this is clearly the province of the judiciary. Once the court decides that an agency
is exercising its discretion within legislative bounds, the agency's action should
be reviewed only to determine whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously,
or abused the discretion committed to it by the legislature. The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Yuma acted wisely in recognizing the principle ofjudicial deference and
correctly deferred to the Commissioner's decision to proceed against Yuma as the
operator of record to clean up and properly close the well.
The importance ofjudicial deference is also seen in several administrative law
doctrines. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative
remedies, and the prohibition on collateral attacks all recognize agency expertise
and serve to allow agencies to effectively administer complex statutes and
regulations in highly technical areas. Agency action in the form of adjudication and
rule-making necessarily involves setting policy. If courts have a broad scope of
review over agency decisions, they would thwart agencypolicy implementation, and
agencies would be relegated to implementing the policies of the judiciary.
James H. Dupuis, Jr.
102. Id. at 791.
103. Whereas Simmons involved a collateral attack on a factual finding, Pierce v. Goldking
Properties. Inc., 396 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) concerned a challenge to the Conmmissioner's
discretion in setting the effective date of a unitization order. Pierce alleged that his lessee breached its
duty to Pierce by failing to request that the Commissioner make the effective date earlier rather than
later. That act had the effect of denying Pierce a share of production until the effective date of the unit.
The court stated that this allegation was a collateral attack on the Commissioner's order and affirmed
the lower court's judgment in favor of the lessee.
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